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1- Introduction 
The Principle of Non-interference into the internal affairs of ASEAN member states has been the 
long and trusted ‘modus operandi’ since the inception of the Association in 1967. This method of 
non-inclusiveness relation has gone through several phases of changes in almost all fields of 
cooperation except when it concerns political-security issues. 
This paper intends to discuss why this principle has been accepted, embraced and defended by 
most of ASEAN members despite urges from international community to the association  to 
modify the doctrine in order to make ASEAN relevant and progressive. The reoccurrence of the 
`Myanmar Issue’, the politically motivated court case against Aung Sun Suu Kyii, has once again 
marred ASEAN’s image as a regional power house. In the final analysis, the author wish to 
propose some significant amendments to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) which 
embedded the non-interference principle as one of the most important pre-requisite in intra-
regional relations. 
2- The Origin of the Principle 
The non-interference principle (NIP) has been one of the most important guidelines for ASEAN 
internal relations. This principle, which is a part of the larger doctrine of the ‘ASEAN Way’, has 
been embedded in all ASEAN major documents and continues to be its modus operandi. 
However, as ASEAN membership became larger and the region started to experience significant 
incidents such as the 1997-98 Asian economic/financial crisis, environmental crises, the 
suppression of political and democratic movements, the global IT and information revolution, 
and the proliferation of human rights movements, the effectiveness of the non-interference policy 
in solving regional conflicts has been targeted for re-examination. 
The concept of non-interference was first introduced in ASEAN’s Bangkok Declaration of 1967. 
This foundation document states that the region wanted to be free from outside interference in its 
internal affairs (Ramcharan, 2000:1). It was further solidified in the ASEAN Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation (TAC) 1971, in Article 2, which acts as a general guideline for intra regional 
relationships between states. Among other things, the article commits ASEAN member states to 
have: 
- mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and 
national identity of all nations; 
- the right of every state to lead its national existence, free from external interference, 
subversion or coercion; and 





The term ‘non-interference’ has been used interchangeably with ‘non-intervention’ (Funston, 
2000:5). Oppenheim (1955) in Wheatley (1993) defines non-intervention as the refraining act of 
a state from a “dictatorial interference by a state in the affairs of another for the purpose of 
maintaining or altering the actual conditions of things”.  
The Oxford English Dictionary defines non-intervention as “the policy of not becoming involved 
in the affairs of other countries”. The Cambridge International Dictionary of English defines 
non-intervention as the “refusal to take part, especially in a disagreement between countries or 
within a country”. 
 
4- Operational Definition of ASEAN’s Non-Interference Principle 
What does non-interference mean in ASEAN politics from an operational point of view? 
Acharya (2001:58) explains the four precepts of non-interference policy among ASEAN member 
states as: 
i- Refraining from criticising the actions of the government of member states towards 
its own people. 
ii- Directing criticism at the actions of states that are perceived to constitute a breach of 
the principle of non-intervention. 
iii- Denying recognition, sanctuary, or other forms of support to any rebel group seeking 
to destabilise or overthrow the government of a neighbouring state. 
iv- Providing political support and material assistance to member-states in their actions 
against subversive activities.  
 
5- Why NIP has been embraced by member states 
Every country has its own domestic politics that shape its own policies and actions. As the fabric 
of communities and political beliefs differ from one country to another, every ASEAN member 
has their own reasons to embark on certain policies. These policies and actions may suit 
domestic politics, but could on occasion be a cause of concern to others. Therefore, using the 
non-interference principle to fend off criticism by foreign or neighbouring countries is very 
convenient. Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia, Myanmar and, to some extent, Singapore, have 
hidden behind this principle.  
Malaysian Politics and its Affirmative Action Policy 
Malaysia has been implementing the contentious policy of Affirmative Action (favoritism policy 
towards the Malays and the aboriginal people known as the ‘Bumiputra’) in order to 
economically favour the Bumiputeras compared to the local Chinese. Affirmative Action has 
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been alleged to be discriminatory to other ethnic groups in Malaysia (Means, 1991, & Funston, 
2001). Among the steps taken under Affirmative Action are special quotas for Bumiputeras in 
government business contracts, their appointments to posts in the Federal Civil Service, and 
quotas for university enrolment1. All these steps were included in the Malaysia New Economic 
Policy (NEP), which ran from 1970 until 19902. It was renamed the National Development 
Policy (DPN) from 1990 until 2000, and is still believed to be in use3. 
 
Malaysian politics is no stranger to controversy and the usual political rivalry. In 1998, Mahathir 
Mohamad, the fourth Prime Minister of Malaysia, decided to dismiss his anointed Deputy, 
Anwar Ibrahim, on the basis of corruption and immorality. Many voices of criticism could be 
heard from various regional leaders. President Estrada of the Philippines, who was a personal 
friend of Anwar, was among the loudest of all. Anwar was Mahathir’s third deputy and he 
repeatedly pronounced that he was the heir apparent to the Prime Minister’s post 
Thai Politics and the Country’s Southern Muslims  
Thailand faced inter-ethnic tension in its southern provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, 
which are predominantly inhabited by Muslim Malay Thais. Allegations were levelled against 
the Thai government to the effect that Muslims in the south had been treated harshly, partly 
because of their resistance to adopting the Thai/ Buddhist culture. The election of Thaksin in 
2001 exacerbated the situation, particularly following some of the political actions taken by him 
in this region. Malaysia as the neighbouring country expressed its concern over some of the 
actions taken by Bangkok to curb Muslim insurgency, which included mass arrests and 
discriminatory policies4. 
Thaksin Shinawatra became Thailand’s Prime Minister in 2001 when his party, Thai Rak Thai 
(TRT-Thais Love Thai), won a landslide victory in one of the most open and corruption-free 
elections in Thai history5. Thaksin’s TRT party thrived on populist propaganda, which resounded 
perfectly with the Thai public. Despite being elected overwhelmingly by the Thais, his 
government was frequently challenged with allegations of dictatorship, demagogy, corruption, 
                                                            
1 Please refer to http://www.icu.gov.my/icu/pdf/artikel/DEB.pdf the official site of Malaysia’s Information 
Coordination Unit (ICU), the Prime Minister’s Department of Malaysia for brief information on NEP. 
2 The NEP targeted a 30% share of the economy for the Bumiputra, but according to official government statistics, 
the NEP did not succeed in reaching this target. Although the policy ended officially in 1990, Malaysians often refer 
to the NEP in the present tense because many of the tangible economic benefits it offered the Bumiputra are 
ongoing. In 2005, some politicians from the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the leading political 
party of the governing Barisan Nasional coalition, called for the restoration of the NEP as part of the New National 
Agenda (NNA). 
3 Please refer to Goh, Cheng Teik (1994). Malaysia: Beyond Communal Politics. Pelanduk Publications for further 
information. 
4 Please refer to Harish, S.P. 2006. ‘Ethnic or Religious Cleavage? Investigating the Nature Of The Conflict in 
Southern Thailand’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 28,No. 1: 48-69. 
5 Robert B. Albritton and Thawilwadee Bureekul (2004), ‘Developing Democracy under a New Constitution in 
Thailand’, National Taiwan University and Academia Sinica Asian Barometer Project Office Working Paper Series 
No. 28,  
4 
 
conflicts of interest, human rights offences, acting undiplomatically, the use of legal loopholes 
and hostility towards a free press6. Although Thailand was steadily recovering from the 1997-




Malaysia and Singapore practice almost the same kind of authoritarian democracy, but different 
groups of people, whom are the majority of their citizens, benefit. Malaysia is predominantly a 
Malay nation state (Malay 50.4%, Chinese 23.7%, indigenous 11%, Indian 7.1%, others 7.8% 
(2004 est.))7 while Singapore is a predominantly Chinese island state (Chinese 76.8%, Malay 
13.9%, Indian 7.9%, other 1.4% (2000 census))8. The Malaysian Barisan Nasional (National 
Front) government always plays the race card and embarks on policies that are based on the 
Affirmative Action strategy by giving special treatment to the Malays and Bumiputeras (sons of 
the soil) ethnic group. This has been a very successful strategy as the Barisan Nasional 
government has never lost general elections and always returns with a two-thirds majority in the 
Malaysian parliament’s lower house9 
The island state of Singapore, on the other hand, is a Chinese majority country that rules its 
citizen with hard but effective policies. Like the Barisan Nasional government in Malaysia, the 
People’s Action Party (PAP) has ruled through government since its separation from Malaysia in 
1965. With more than two-thirds of its citizens of Chinese ethnic origin, PAP has ruled 
Singapore without much resistance from the minority Malay and Indian groups. PAP, which was 
a left-leaning party during its early years, transformed its ideology ground to become more 
centred, or even more to the right. Thereafter, PAP ruled by adhering to four major ideologies: 
pragmatism, meritocracy, multiracialism and Asian values, or communitarianism (Mauzy & 
Milne, 2002:41). 
6- Regional Events that Questioned the Principle 
In the history of ASEAN, four major events have tested the Association’s non-interference 
principle, three of which have been relatively settled. These events are the 1997-1998 Asian 
Financial Crisis, The Indonesian Trans-boundary Haze Pollution Problem, the Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome Epidemic (SARS) and the political unrest in Myanmar. 
1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis 
                                                            
6 The Star, ‘Dreaded day dawns – despite lies and dark forces’, 2 April 2006 
7 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/my.html 
8 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sn.html 
9 The Barisan Nasional is a composition of 14 political parties nationwide formed in 1973 as the successor to the 
Perikatan. The main political parties in the coalition are United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), the 
Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). As UMNO is the dominant party 
with the largest number of representatives in parliament, it plays the role of the leader in this coalition. At the time 
of writing this thesis, the Coalition Government has just suffered its worst election result since independence when 
the opposition parties, spearheaded by Anwar Ibrahim, denied the Coalition the two-thirds majority in the recently 
concluded 8 March 2008 general election. But the Coalition still enjoys a substantial support from the mass, gaining 




There have been many theories and assumptions made as to why the Asian Financial Crisis 
occurred from the middle of July 1997 to February of 1998. Some of the causes identified are 
poor government policies, ineffective national financial systems and practices, private sector 
debt problems and poor loan quality, rising external liabilities for borrowing countries, the 
pegging of local currencies and the U.S. dollar, a global economic slowdown, balance-of-
payments (BOP) difficulties, and changes to the technology used in financial markets10. The 
International Monetary Fund was also criticised for bad diagnosis and bad prescription 
(Severino, 2002:98). 
Haze Problem 
As if the region was not in enough trouble, Southeast Asian countries also faced an 
environmental catastrophe in the form of haze pollution originating from the peat fires in 
Indonesia. Although some fires started as a result of drought, accidental fires and acts of nature, 
it was reported that the Indonesian Haze of 1997-1998 was also the result of deliberate burning 
and clearing by plantation corporations, in order to clear the lands and make way for mass palm 
oil and timber plantations (Severiono, 2006:108). By the end of 1998, it was estimated that some 
8 million hectares of land had burnt, affecting millions of people in the region in terms of health 
and finance. It was estimated at the time that the financial losses amounted to around $4.5 
billion11 
SARS Problem 
The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic that swept through Asia was dealt 
with in a decisive and a timely manner by all ASEAN countries. ASEAN countries understood 
that immediate remedial steps should be taken as this epidemic must be contained before it could 
cause further damage. The first SARS case took place in Guangdong Province in China in 2002. 
SARS’ first appearance in an ASEAN country was in Vietnam’s Hanoi, brought in by a business 




Myanmar has been a source of embarrassment to ASEAN, partly due to the inability of the 
Association to find a resounding solution to the prolonged episode and partly to the failure of the 
ruling military junta to take heed of the good faith and political persuasion offered by everyone 
                                                            
10 Congressional Research Services report to the U.S. Congress by Dick K. Nanto titled ‘The 1997-1998 Asian 
Financial Crisis’ at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/crs-asia2.htm 
11 The fires originally only affected Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore but by early 1998, countries as far as 
Thailand and Brunei also felt the effects of the haze. For a comprehensive reading, refer to Glover, David & Jessup, 




in an attempt to change the political landscape in Myanmar12. Despite numerous appeals by 
ASEAN and even the United Nations, the military regime in Yangon (previously known as 
Rangoon) has always found excuses to maintain the status quo. Myanmar’s persistent rejection to 
any significant political reconciliation with the democratic movements has started to become a 
‘burden’ and the source of humiliation to other ASEAN members (Ganesan, 2006:132).  
 
The regime has resisted any political change, fearing that such a shift would spell the end to the 
junta administration. Since its acceptance into ASEAN in 1997, Myanmar/Burma13 has disrupted 
some of ASEAN’s relations with other regional countries and organisations. However, ASEAN’s 
insistence on Myanmar’s inclusion in all its activities has resulted in attempts to boycotts and 
disengagement, as well as the abandonment of projects14. 
 
7- What were the Effects of such a Position? 
The absence of a clear interpretation of what constitutes non-interference in ASEAN politics has 
resulted in two most obvious effects. These are: 
i- Inconsistency in policy 
Despite generally abiding by the non-interference principal among ASEAN countries, leaders 
and politicians from member countries still make comments on and give their reactions to events 
that occur in member countries. Jawhar put it correctly when he stated that “…countries will 
assume that they have the right to comment on others but reject when they themselves are being 
criticised”. He cited the case of Thailand, which was vocal on the issue of Aung San Suu Kyi of 
Myanmar, but reacted fiercely when efforts were being made by some ASEAN countries to 
discuss Southern Thailand’s political problems. The conflict in the Muslim majority provinces of 
Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani against the Buddhist federal government saw a lot of political 
tribulation including incidents that led to the loss of human lives, especially when Thaksin was in 
office. This attracted a lot of attention, especially from ASEAN’s Muslim majority members 
such as neighbouring Malaysia and Indonesia. 
 
 
                                                            
12 An interview with Razali Ismail, the special UN envoy to Myanmar revealed that Myanmar has never had any 
serious intention of trying democracy. Its military leaders were reluctant to share its power with the democratic 
parties fearing a backlash in terms of retribution and losing power. 
13 The military government changed the name Burma to Myanmar in 1989 in order to break away from any colonial 
legacy. The name Burma was given by the British when in colonised the country.  On 18 June 1989, the military 
junta passed the 'Adaptation of Expressions Law' that officially changed the English version of the country's name 
from Burma to Myanmar, and changed the English versions of many place names in the country along with it, such 
as its former capital city from Rangoon to Yangon. 
14 As a result of Myanmar’s inclusion to ASEAN, EU had called off the 1997 ASEAN-EU Joint Cooperation 
Committee Meeting and the problem persist when Myanmar officials Visas were not approved for the 1998 ASEM 
II meeting in London. However, after much diplomatic discussion, the EU decided to allow Myanmar to be involve 
in ASEM meeting as an observer (Pattugalan, 1999:49). 
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Inability to resolve conflicts 
The other obvious effect that resulted from adhering to the non-interference principal was the 
inability on the part of Malaysia as a member, and ASEAN as the regional organisation, to 
resolve conflicts in the region. Some conflicts such as Southern Mindanao, Southern Thailand 
(which both share borders with Malaysia) and the Suu Kyi detention remain unresolved to this 
day, and have even escalated to new heights. The inability of ASEAN to find solutions to 
bilateral conflicts between member countries saw Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore present 
their cases to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to find amicable solutions, rather than 
referring to mechanisms that existed in ASEAN such as the ASEAN High Council15. 
8- Some Proposals - What kind of interference and who determines this? 
ASEAN must adjust its modus operandi when dealing with intrastate conflict if it wants to 
remain relevant in the future. Larger regional organisations such as the African Union have 
changed their attitude of non-interference towards promoting and protecting the basic human 
rights of their peoples. The AU recognises that protecting the lives, dignity and property of its 
peoples is the collective responsibility of the union and should not be left exclusively to the 
individual member states. 
Therefore, the researcher feels that ASEAN can amend the non-interference principal if it wants 
to, possibly in two stages. 
i- Stage one 
The introduction of amendments to the 1967 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation under Article 
2 (c) which states: 
 
“Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; unless pursuant to a decision 
by the ASEAN Head of Government Summit, the Association has the right to 
intervene in respect of grave circumstances namely: war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity. The Contracting Party involved will be referred to the 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) for consultation and finding solution. In the 
event that no solution could be found, the aforementioned crisis will be referred to 
the ASEAN High Council for further deliberation”. 
 
With this amendment, at least ASEAN countries could start the process of open and public 
discussion concerning grave human rights violations by member states, without violating the 
non-interference principal. The issue can be legally discussed during the biannual AMM 
meeting, even if it has to be done in a closed-door session. However, the decision made must be 
binding and submitted to the ASEAN Summit meeting for recognition and implementation. 
                                                            
15 Malaysia and Indonesia fought the co-claimant case of Pulau Sipadan and Ligitan at The Hague while Malaysia 
and Singapore sought the help of the ICJ on the co-claim to Pulau Batu Putih. 
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The role of the High Council must be expanded. It not only deals with bilateral conflicts among 
member states, but also intrastate conflicts. An amendment therefore must be made under Article 
13 of the TAC, which reads: 
 
“The High Contracting Parties shall have the determination and good faith to prevent 
disputes from arising. In case disputes on matters directly affecting them should arise, 
especially disputes likely to disturb regional peace and harmony, they shall refrain from 
the threat or use of force and shall at all times settle such disputes among themselves 
through friendly negotiations. In addition to the above, intrastate conflict will also be 
deliberated in the name of avoiding grave circumstances namely war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity”. 
ii- Stage two 
 
If the conflict escalates and the recommendation of the High Council or the ASEAN Summit 
is ignored, ASEAN could take the next course of action, which involves political and 
economic sanctions. In this respect, ASEAN does not have to amend its constitution, as 
political and economic sanctions do not constitute the threat or the use of force. What is only 
needed is a resolution during the ASEAN Summit, which could be taken consensually or by 
vote of the majority as permitted by the ASEAN Charter. 
 
ASEAN has a history of taking tough political decisions. The postponement of Cambodia’s 
induction into ASEAN in 1997 due to the political coup by Hun Sen shows that ASEAN 
could take hard decisions while defending the non-interference principal. One could argue 
that Cambodia was not a member at that time, but the consensus achieved to postpone the 
admission in itself was a commendable decision. 
 
Conclusion 
There is no doubt that the non-interference principal has played an important role and 
contributed significantly to the stability of the region in the past. ASEAN countries needed the 
space to build their nations and fight internal battles freely and without interference. The region 
as a whole has been relatively safe and secured. However, upon close inspection at the intrastate 
level, some member states have faced internal political conflicts that have also affected their 
neighbouring countries.  
 
Some of the current conflicts, which were originally considered as internal affairs, have the 
potential to spillover, which if not attended to properly will affect bilateral and regional 
relationships. Malaysia is one of the countries caught between these internal conflicts, but it does 
not have the right to express any viewpoint due to the doctrine of non-interference. The 
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‘explosion’ of the information age and the embracement of universal values such as a respect for 
human rights have amplified these conflicts and made them impossible to be ignored. 
 
Changes to the traditional principles of non-interference and the ASEAN Way are vital if 
ASEAN is to remain relevant in today’s world. However, the Association has to modify and 
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